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INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property is heralded by some as the "foundation of
human -existence,"' protecting invention and innovation while
LL.M., Lewis and Clark Law School; Law Degree, University of Mendoza.
Currently Staff Attorney at the Center for International Environmental Law
("CIEL") in Geneva, Switzerland. This paper was prepared for a presentation at the
American Society of International Law Regional Meeting "Communities and
Commodities: Linking International Trade and Sustainable Development"
organized by the American University, Washington College of Law's International
Law Review and International Legal Studies Program on March 28, 2003. The
views expressed in the paper are the personal views of the writer and do not
represent the views of CIEL.
1. Press Release, World Intellectual Property Organization, Dr. Kamil Idris
Re-approved as WIPO Director General (May 27, 2003) (quoting Dr. Kamil Idris
in
his
acceptance
speech),
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/index.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2003).
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improving standards of life through choices for consumers and new
outlets for human activity.' Others see intellectual property rights
("IPRs") as merely a government sanctioned monopoly and subsidy
that puts territorial borders around technologies and other inventions
so that firms can maximize their profits.3 Charged with analyzing
whether, and how, IPRs could play a role in reducing poverty and
hunger, improving health and education, and ensuring environmental
sustainability, the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights ("IPR
Commission"), established by the United Kingdom government,
concluded that the value of intellectual property protection for
society varies according to factors such as the economic and social
circumstances in which it is applied.4 In other words, in order for
intellectual property to act as an effective instrument of sustainable
development, countries must design their regimes according to their
particular needs and conditions.
Attempts to adapt IPRs to national requirements, however, now
face hurdles set by intermational intellectual property rules.
Multilateral intellectual property agreements establish standards of
protection that must be implemented at the national levels and thus
delineate and circumscribe countries' prerogatives in the field of
intellectual property.' The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
2. See J. M. Aubrey, A Justification of the Patent System, in PATENTS IN

PERSPECTIVE I (Jeremy Phillips ed., 1985) (claiming these to be the primary
objectives of intellectual property).
.3. See GENETIC RESOURCES ACTION INTERNATIONAL, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND BIODIVERSITY: THE ECONOMIC MYTHS, 3 GLOBAL TRADE
& BIODIVERSITY IN CONFLICT 16 (1998) (defining intellectual property as "a

government
sanctioned
monopoly
and
subsidy"),
available
at
http://www.grain.org/publications/issue3-en.cfm (last visited Sept. 5, 2003).
Intellectual property law "puts territorial borders around technologies and other
inventions so that companies can maximize their profits." Id. at 15.
4. See COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTEGRATING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 155 (2002)
[hereinafter IPR COMMISSION] (asserting that the interests of developing countries
are best served "by tailoring their intellectual property regimes to their particular
economic
and
social
circumstances),
available
at
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final-report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf
(last
visited Sept. 5, 2003).
5. See infra notes 6-8 (explaining how multilateral agreements seek to
establish minimum standards which countries must implement within their own
systems).

2003]

BILA TERAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYAGREEMENTS

47

Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS Agreement"), for instance,
establishes minimum standards of intellectual property protection
with which all World Trade Organization ("WTO") Members will
eventually have to comply.6 These increased standards of protection
create challenges to developing countries that attempt to fulfill
TRIPS standards while trying to adopt policies to achieve economic
and social development.7 Nevertheless, the TRIPS Agreement still
allows countries some flexibility to overcome the obstacles that high
intellectual property standards may pose to sustainable
development.8
Other intellectual property rules currently being developed,
though, may erode these flexibilities. Particularly worrisome are
rules agreed upon through bilateral negotiations. Both the United
States and the European Union ("EU"), for example, are pursuing an
increasing number of bilateral trade and investment negotiations that
often include intellectual property.9 These negotiations have resulted
in agreements that take intellectual property protection standards
beyond the levels established at the multilateral sphere and seriously
threaten countries' ability to tailor intellectual property laws to
correspond to their public policy objectives. ° What role does the
6. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex IC, art. 1, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol.
31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (requiring Members to
available at
give effect to the provisions of the Agreement),
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/27-trips.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2003).
7. See CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 5

(2d ed. 2000) (stating that the TRIPS Agreement restricts the options available to
developing countries and ignores profound differences in economic and
technological capabilities between the North and the South ).
8. See id. (recognizing that the TRIPS Agreement leaves a certain room for
maneuver at the national level).
9. See Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, United
States and Chile Sign Historic Free Trade Agreement (June 19, 2003) [hereinafter
USTR Press Release] (noting other developments in bilateral negotiations between
the United States and Australia, Morocco, and various South American and South
African nations), available at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2003/06/03-37.pdf (last
visited Sept. 5, 2003).
10. See IPR COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 162 (recommending that developing
nations should not accept additional IPRs imposed by the developed world through
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Free Trade Area of the Americas ("FTAA") play in this context? Can
this regional trade agreement counter the wave of higher IPRs
standards generated through bilateralism? Can developing countries
use their numerical advantage in the FTAA negotiations to include
such fundamental issues to sustainable development as traditional
knowledge that still have not been resolved by the WTO or the
World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO")? Or, is the
FTAA merely another stepping stone to higher intellectual property
standards that primarily benefit developed countries that are home to
the producers of knowledge and owners of IPRs?
This article asserts that the FTAA presents more of a risk than an
opportunity for intellectual property to act as a tool for sustainable
development.1 1 It analyzes some of the intellectual property
provisions in the draft Chapter on IPRs that exemplify the loss of
countries' ability to take measures indispensable to ensure IPRs do
not negatively affect key areas to sustainable development. 12In
addition, it looks at the uncertain possibilities of the FTAA having
positive outcomes for development, such as precluding bilateral
negotiations.3
Specifically, section I will provide background on the nature of
IPRs, the process of international intellectual property standardsetting, and the challenges it presents to sustainable development.' 4
Section II will focus on the inclusion of intellectual property in the
FTAA analyzing some of the potential opportunities and risks of the
draft Chapter on IPRs."5 Finally, this article will conclude by
highlighting the reasons why the draft Chapter on IPRs poses more
problems than possibilities for sustainable development.

bilateral and regional trade and investment agreements beyond their commitments

from existing international agreements).
11. See infra Part II.B (assessing the particular risks that the FTAA poses to
sustainable development).
12. See infra Part II.A-B (examining both general and specific provisions of the
FTAA).
13. See infra Part II.A (analyzing the potential opportunities of the FTAA).

14. See infra Part II (providing background information on IPRs).
15. See infra Part II.A-B (examining the benefits and risks of including
intellectual property protection in the FTAA).
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I. IPRS, RISING INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS, AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
A. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INSTRUMENT OF PUBLIC POLICY OR A
SACRED COW?

Intellectual property plays a key role in society. IPRs encourage
innovation by protecting intellectual activity and granting their
holder, the creator or innovator, the ability to exclude others from
certain activities for a defined period of time.' 6 IPRs also promote
creativity by ensuring ideas ultimately are disseminated to generate
more innovation. 7 For example, patents reward inventors by
excluding others from commercially exploiting the invention for a
limited period, but at the same time ensure that others gain the
benefit of the invention by requiring its disclosure and its eventual
lapse into the public domain.' 8 Moreover, even during the term of
protection of the private right, intellectual property is not absolute;
limitations ensure that privileges do not threaten the public interest.' 9
Common exceptions to patents include acts done privately and for
non-commercial purpose, use of the invention for research or
teaching, and importation of a patented product that has been
marketed in another country with the consent of the patent owner.2 0
IPRs must then balance the interests of the individual to secure a fair
value for his intellectual effort or investment of capital and labor and

16. See W. R. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 5 (Sweet and Maxwell
1989) (believing the importance of intellectual property stems from its function of
protecting "applications of ideas and information that are of commercial value").
17. See Aubrey, supra note 2, at 6 (naming other benefits as providing "new,
cheaper or improved commodities and a general enhancement of the standard of
living").
18. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION,
WIPO
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HANDBOOK: POLICY, LAW AND USE 17 (3d ed. 2001)
(defining the term "patent"), available at http://www.wipo.org/about-ip/en/ (last
visited Sept. 5, 2003).
19. See Aubrey, supra note 2, at 5 (describing how, once a government grants a
patent, third parties still have the right to attack its validity).
20. See CORREA, supra note 7, at 75 (listing the exceptions allowed by article
30 of the TRIPS Agreement).
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the interests of society in its economic and cultural development. 2'
As one commentator put it, IPRs are not a "sacred cow;" that is, they
are not rights that cannot be tailored or restricted.22 They are justified
to the extent that benefits to society exceed any associated costs.2
Intellectual property, in other words, should be an instrument of
public policy and never an end in itself.
Traditionally, countries have designed their intellectual property
systems to respond to economic and social interests and to promote

sustainable development.2 4 Korea, for example, had lax intellectual
property protection during the 1960s and 1970s as local firms were

acquiring, assimilating, and adapting large amounts of foreign
technology through reverse engineering.25 In the 1980s and 1990s,
however, Korea focused on adequate protection and enforcement of
IPRs as its industrialization process unfolded and local firms
undertook creative imitation through formal technology transfer.26
Countries presently pursuing development still need the flexibility to
make IPRs work towards their increased growth and well-being, but

21. See CORNISH, supra note 16, at 6 (arguing also that IPRs should balance
"the interests of the individual to secure a fair value for his intellectual effort. or
investment of capital [and] labor" and the interests of society in its economic and
cultural development).

22. See JEREMY PHILLIPS & ALISON FIRTH, INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 10 (3d ed. 1995) (stating that IPRs are a means to achieve societal
objectives).
23. See IPR COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 15 (stating that costs of the IP
system need to be weighed against the benefits arising from that system).
24. See Linsu Kim, Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property Rights:
Lessons from Korea's Experience 5 (2002) (referring to a study conducted by the
United Nations Commission for Trade and Development ("UNCTAD")), available
at http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs/Kim2002.pdf (last visited Sept. 6,
2003).
25. See IPR COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 20 (highlighting that this method
played an important part in Korea's development of indigenous technologies and
innovative capacity); see also Kim, supra note 24, at 16 (noting the role of the
government funded Korea Institute of Science and Technology).
26. See Kim, supra note 24, at 21 (describing how this is a natural progression
from the mature technology stage to the intermediate technology stage).
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current trends in international intellectual property standard-setting
seriously limit their room to maneuver.2 7
B. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY
While it was national legislation that customarily established
intellectual property standards in accordance with the needs and
circumstances of individual countries, multilateral intellectual
property agreements began defining and delimiting countries'
options in this respect.28 Early agreements, however, such as the Paris
Convention of 1883 and the Berne Convention of 1886, set up only
minimal structures and still allowed countries to adopt different
substantive standards.29
More recently such flexibility started coming under intense
pressure.30 In 1995, the TRIPS Agreement came into force and
required all WTO Members to provide minimum standards of
intellectual property protection.3 The insertion of IPRs into the
multilateral trading system reflects their growing importance in the
international economy and the consequent interest of countries with a
high level of technological and industrial capacity in ensuring global

27. See id. at 6 (concluding that the "result of stronger IPR protection [in
developing countries] is a reduction in knowledge flows from advanced countries,
and a lower rate of innovative activity).
28. See generally, e.g., Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual
Property, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 306, available at
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo020en.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2003);
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 14, 1967,
S.
TREATY
Doc. No.
99-27,
828
U.N.T.S.
222,
available at
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/woOOlen.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2003);

TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6.
29. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property, supra note
28 (giving minimum structure while allowing flexibility in determining intellectual
property standards); see also Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, supra note 28, (limiting the design of a country's intellectual
property standards).
30. See IPR COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 5 (listing several manifestations of
the recent increase in IPRs protection).
31. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 1 (requiring Members to give
effect to the provisions of the Agreement). The TRIPS Agreement also allows, but
does not require, Members to "implement in their law more extensive protection
than is required." Id.
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standards of protection.32 However, those minimum standards
universalized the levels of intellectual property protection established
by industrialized countries only after reaching a certain level of
development.33 The broad protection of IPRs thus limited the options
for developing countries in the design of their intellectual property
systems. Nevertheless, the TRIPS Agreement maintained some space
for countries to adopt different strategies.34 For instance, the TRIPS
Agreement does not define "invention," thus allowing countries to
choose the definition that responds to their own needs.35 Such
flexibility becomes critical for countries to be able to use their
intellectual property legislation as a means of achieving a set of
economic development, social development, and environmental
protection objectives.36 Thus, the TRIPS Agreement represents, for
many developing countries, the "upper limit" of acceptable
standards.37
Notwithstanding, international intellectual property negotiations
persist and new and higher intellectual property standards continue to
be set. WIPO's "Patent Agenda," for instance, aims to further
harmonize patent law partly through a treaty creating substantive
standards for patents.38 The most active forum in intellectual property

32. See CORNISH, supra note 16, at 5 (claiming the subject is of greater
importance due to the fact that, among other reasons, "the fund of exploitable ideas
[is becoming] more sophisticated").
33. See CORREA, supra note 7, at 3 (placing the negotiation of the TRIPS
Agreement in context).
34. See CORREA, supra note 7, at 5 (recognizing that the TRIPS Agreement
leaves some room for maneuver).
35. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 27 (requiring the invention only
to be "new, involve an inventive step and [be] capable of industrial application").
36. See CORREA, supra note 7, at 21 (arguing that the "main guiding criterion
for the reform of national laws for that purpose should lie in striking a proper
balance between ... the protection of technology on the one hand and the
promotion of its transfer and dissemination on the other").
37. See id. at 8 (discussing how this upper limit provides a defense for
developing countries "against the demands for higher levels of protection or for
ignoring the transitional terms provided for by the [TRIPS] Agreement").
38. See CARLOS M. CORREA & SISULE F. MUSUNGU, THE WIPO PATENT
AGENDA: THE RISKS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1, 5-24 (South Centre, Working
Paper No. 12, 2002) (analyzing the implications of the WIPO Patent Agenda),
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negotiations, however, remains at the bilateral level. Many
commentators believe that developing countries accept such
negotiations as an unavoidable price to pay for increased market
access or investment agreements with developed countries.39
Industrialized countries are thus able to design the bilateral
agreements specifically to respond to the perceived "shortcomings"
of the TRIPS Agreement and extend intellectual property protection
standards far above multilateral levels. 40 As a consequence, "TRIPS-

plus" standards, that is, standards more extensive than those of the
TRIPS Agreement or that eliminate options existent under the TRIPS
Agreement, emerge as the norm in bilateral agreements. 4' The free
trade agreements signed between the United States and countries
such as Jordan, Chile, and Singapore clearly demonstrate this
phenomenon. The same model is also being used for regional
agreements, which may eventually make futile any flexibility
provided by the multilateral system. As expressed by the
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, developing countries
face "unprecedented limits on the freedom ... to act as they see fit"

in the field of intellectual property .42
C.

CHALLENGES TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Intellectual property becomes a tool for promoting innovation and
advancing development when private rights are balanced with the
interests and needs of society. However, when high standards limit
available at http://www.southcentre.org/publications/wipopatent/wipopatent.pdf
(last visited Sept. 10, 2003).
39. See PETER DRAHOS, BILATERALISM IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Oxfam,
Policy Paper No. 9, 2001) (stating that developing countries have little or no
control over the highly complex multilateral/bilateral web of IPRs developed
at
available
creating),
are
countries
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/policy/papers/bilateral/bilateral.rtf (last visited Sept. 10,
2003).
40. See id. at 8 (explaining that developed countries like the United States can

resolve ambiguities they perceive in the TRIPS Agreement through bilateral
agreements).
41. See id. at 4 (summarizing the two types of provisions considered to be
"TRIPS-plus" provisions).

42. See IPR COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 155 (denoting that developing
countries are limited to act "as they see fit" towards intellectual property
protection).
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countries' abilities to achieve the particular balance demanded by
their circumstances, IPRs raise concerns in several key areas of
public interest, particularly for developing countries, including
technological development, public health, and food security.
Contrary to some of the key tenets of intellectual property, for
instance, broad protection for IPRs may impede technological
development. Intellectual property systems designed for highly
industrialized countries may actually hinder innovation relevant to
developing countries, which is often informal.43 Moreover, though
transfer and dissemination of technology should result from
intellectual property protection, stronger protection and enforcement
of IPRs may also increase their holders' control over technology,
resulting in anti-competitive practices and prohibitive high prices."
Prior to the TRIPS Agreement, countries had the freedom to
provide intellectual property protection to inventions relating to
public health only insofar they considered it appropriate to their
particular conditions and needs. In fact, most countries have, at some
point, denied patents over pharmaceutical products and processes as
a matter of public policy. The TRIPS Agreement obliges countries to
provide patent protection to any invention, whether product or
process, in all fields of technology, in a provision that many feared
would negatively impact the affordability and availability of
medicines in developing countries.45 The Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health ("Doha Declaration"),
however, clarified that the TRIPS Agreement "does not and should
not prevent Members from taking measures to protect public
health." 46 Intellectual property negotiations outside of the WTO
43. See SIMON WALKER, THE TRIPS
DEVELOPMENT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 15-17

AGREEMENT,

SUSTAINABLE

(1UCN, Environmental Policy
and Law Paper No. 41, 2001) (arguing that it is uncertain whether implementation
of the TRIPS Agreement will contribute to innovation in developing nations),
available at http://www.uicn.org/themes/law/pdfdocuments/EPLP41EN.pdf

(last

visited Sept 11, 2003).
44. See id. at 16 (commenting on how over-broad patents could stifle research).
45. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 27 (requiring Members to make
patents available for any inventions in technology fields).
46. World Trade Organization, Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreements
and Public Health, para. 4, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 [hereinafter Doha Declaration]

(affirming how Members should interpret the TRIPS Agreement), available at
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should therefore be especially careful not to limit countries' rights to
develop policies promoting broad access to safe, effective, and
affordable treatments.
Agriculture is another area where most developing countries did
not provide intellectual property protection since, to a large extent,
their food supply structures are based on the practice of passing on
and exchanging homebred varieties of plants.4" The TRIPS
Agreement, however, required Members to provide for some form of
plant variety protection, raising concerns that restrictions on seed
saving and exchange could adversely affect food security. The
Agreement does provide some flexibility, though. WTO Members
can decide whether plant variety protection is achieved through
patents, an "effective sui generis system," or a combination of the
two options.48
The option to develop a system with the characteristics that would
ensure farmers' and breeders' access to seeds is crucial for
developing countries, but bilateral and regional intellectual property
standards may be eroding this possibility. For example, these
standards designate the International Union for the Protection of
New Varieties of Plants ("UPOV")4 9 as the system of plant variety
protection. However, UPOV has been criticized for responding to the
needs of commercial breeders and for failing to consider the varieties
developed and used by small farmers in developing countries.50 In
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/minist e/mindecl-tripse.htm
Sept. 13, 2003).

(last

visited

47. See GEOFF TANSEY, QUAKER UNITED NATIONS OFFICE, FOOD SECURITY,
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3-6 (2002) (stating the reasons
the developing countries may not provide strong intellectual property rights),
available at http://www.geneva.quno.info/pdf/Fsomo.pdf (last visited Sept. 13,
2003)
48. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 27.3(b) (listing the means that
Members can choose to protect plant varieties).
49. See International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants,
openedfor signature Dec. 2, 1961, 33 U.S.T. 2703, 815 U.N.T.S. 109 [hereinafter

UPOV] (proposing a new system to protect different varieties of plants).
50. See, e.g., Phillippe Cullet, Farmers' Rights in Peril,FRONTLINE (Apr. 1-14,
2000) (arguing that the revisions to the UPOV Convention resulted in
"strengthening the rights of commercial breeders and conversely reduced the rights
at
available
farmers"),
of
privileges
and
http://www.flonnet.com/fl1707/17070710.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
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addition, some of the latest bilateral agreements attempt to introduce
the option to patent plants. This type of provision thus threatens to
prevent countries from taking the necessary steps to assure the food
supply of their populations and the maintenance of structures for
local self-sufficiency with respect to seed and food."
II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE FTAA
By negotiating the FTAA, countries aim to achieve "development
and prosperity."52 In 1994, thirty-four countries in the Americas
agreed to construct a free trade agreement to progressively eliminate
trade barriers. 3 Their commitment to jointly pursue prosperity did
not merely include opening markets, however, but also preserving
and
strengthening
democracy,
eradicating
poverty
and
4
development.1
sustainable
guaranteeing
and
discrimination,
Countries pledged, for instance, to facilitate the participation of
individuals and associations in political and economic activity, to
improve access to primary health care, and to advance social and
economic prosperity in a manner compatible with environmental
protection. 5 Negotiations began towards reaching "balanced and
comprehensive" agreements on issues like tariffs and non-tariff
barriers, agriculture, subsidies, investment, intellectual property
rights, technical barriers to trade, safeguards, and antidumping and

51. See ActionAid, Food Rights: Patents (noting that "up to 1.4 billion people
in poor countries depend on seeds" and that the developing ability to patent plants
and seeds is threatening poor
farmers
in
developing
countries),
at
http://www.actionaid.org/ourpriorities/foodrights/patents/patents.shtml (last visited
Oct. 15, 2003).
52. See Free Trade Area of the Americas, First Summit of the Americas:
Declarationof Miami [hereinafter Declarationof Miami] (stating the goals of the
First
Summit
of the
Americas),
available at http://www.ftaaalca.org/ministerials/miamie.asp (last visited Sept. 13, 2003).
53. See id. (stating that countries negotiated the FTAA to remove "barriers to
trade and investment").
54. See id. (mentioning that the major goal of the FTAA was to guarantee
"sustainable development").
55. See id. (asserting that the governments drafting the FTAA are "united in
pursuing prosperity through open markets, hemispheric integration, and sustainable
development").
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countervailing duties.16 The eventual drafts of the FTAA Agreement,
however, raised questions as to whether many of the chapters and
provisions are compatible with such high-reaching objectives.
Provisions on intellectual property have particularly attracted
criticism. The Chapter on IPRs, like the rest of the draft FTAA
Agreement, is still mostly in brackets, but certain troublesome
tendencies can already be identified.5 7 Many groups within civil
society have denounced the FTAA negotiations approaching IPRs in
a way that would pose an obstacle to development and improved
58
quality of life in the countries in the Americas.
The FTAA, like the TRIPS Agreement, sets minimum standards
for the protection of IPRs such as copyrights, trademarks,
geographical indications, industrial designs, and patents.5 9 The

FTAA's levels of intellectual property protection, however, go far
beyond those established by the TRIPS Agreement. Commentators
have called the Chapter on IPRs the "most ambitious and diverse

intellectual property agreement ever written. ' 60 It also includes
provisions on new areas such as program-carrying satellite signals,

56. See Free Trade Area of the Americas, First Summit of the Americas: Plan
of Action (outlining the general plan of action for the First Summit of the
Americas), available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ministerials/plan-e.asp (last
visited Sept. 11, 2003).
57. See infra notes 61-87 and accompanying text (describing problematic
aspects of the FTAA Draft).
58. See OXFAM, MAKE TRADE FAIR FOR THE AMERICAS 22-23 (2003) (stating

that such actions pose an obstacle to development and improved quality of life in
at
available
the
Americas),
in
countries
the
http://www.oxfam.org/eng/pdfs/pp030126_FTAA.pdf (last visited Sept. 11. 2003).
59. See Free Trade Area of the Americas, Second Draft Agreement Chapteron
Intellectual PropertyRights, pt. I, art. 1 [hereinafter Second Draft] (setting out the
general provisions for implementing the FTAA Agreement's provisions on IPRs),
availableat http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ftaadraft02/eng/ngipe 1.asp#IPR (last visited
Sept. 11 2003).
60. See David Vivas Eugui, Intellectual Property in the FTAA: New
Imbalances and Small Achievements, BRIDGES: ICTSD ANALYSIS 18-22 (2002)

(underscoring that, while the draft FTAA Agreement expands potential for
sustainable development through the incorporation of traditional knowledge and
folklore in the FTAA's protection of intellectual property, this step may not solve
the major problems relating to global intellectual property issues), available at
http://www.ictsd.org/iprsonline/ictsd/docsiVivasBridgesYear6N8NovDec2002.pdf
(last visited Sept. 11, 2003).
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domain names on the Internet, access to genetic resources, traditional
knowledge, and folklore.6 While some of the innovative provisions
could represent opportunities for developing countries seeking to
protect and develop their resources, the high levels of protection for
private rights constitute an important loss of space for using
intellectual property regulations to respond to the needs of society.
A. POTENTIAL OPPORTUNITIES

Many see the FTAA as a "historic opportunity." 62 In the
intellectual property arena, the FTAA could be positive because it
constitutes a multilateral, standard-setting process and establishes
protection for issues considered fundamental by developing
countries. Multilateral agreements on intellectual property protection
levels could be beneficial for developing countries insofar that they
may preclude bilateral negotiations from setting standards.
Developing countries may thus set intellectual property standards
while having a numerical advantage and the possibility of building
alliances. Multilateral standards, however, were not able to stop
bilateral standard-setting in the past.63 Developing countries expected
the TRIPS Agreement to phase out efforts to raise intellectual
property standards bilaterally. 64
As an example of non-multilateral tinkering with intellectual
property standards, the United States was, at the time of the TRIPS
negotiations, conducting an aggressive campaign based on Section
301 of the U.S. Trade Act.65 Section 301 allows the U.S. government
to impose trade sanctions against foreign countries whose acts,
policies, and practices deny U.S. rights or unjustifiably restrict U.S.
61. See Second Draft,supra note 59, pt. II, secs. 4, 6 (describing the new draft
provisions protecting folklore, traditional knowledge, and access to genetic

resources).
62. See Declaration of Miami, supra note 52 (recognizing that bringing

together thirty-four nations to "create a Partnership for Development and
Prosperity in the Americas" is truly a "historic opportunity").
63. See infra notes 65-70 and accompanying text (providing an example of
how the TRIPS Agreement has done little to rectify countries from seeking
bilateral standards).
64. See DRAHOS, supra note 39, at 3 (noting the likely expectations of
developing nations with respect to the TRIPS Agreement).
65. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (2003)
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commerce. 66 The United States presented the diminution of such
actions as one of the incentives for developing countries to reach an
agreement on intellectual property at the WTO. The minimal
standards of the TRIPS Agreement, however, only became a catalyst
for further bilateral negotiations.67
Furthermore, commentators have criticized the FTAA for not
rectifying the problems of bilateral negotiations. 68 One important
advantage of a multilateral approach is the capacity to avoid the
"confidential affair" of bilateral negotiations, where parties keep the
drafts secret, refrain from consulting congresses, and disregard
public opinion.69 In the FTAA, however, participating countries have
kept the negotiating documents confidential and have released the
draft agreement only after great delay and with no identification of
the countries that introduced or supported each provision.7"
66. See id. § 2411 (setting forth the provisions of Section 301 as amended).
67. See DRAHOS, supra note 39, at 3 (demonstrating that the United States has
steadily established bilateral agreements, even after the TRIPS Agreement entered
into force).
68. See Letter from Robert Weissman, Co-Director, Essential Action, to Gloria
Blue, Executive Secretary, Trade Policy Staff Committee, Office of the USTR
(Aug. 22, 2001) [hereinafter Essential Action Letter] (echoing the notion that the
FTAA will exclude weaker nations in the future, just as bilateral agreements do
currently,
thus
making
the
FTAA
undesirable),
available at
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2001-August/00 1761.html (last visited
Sept. 6, 2003).
69. See GENETIC RESOURCES
ACTION INTERNATIONAL,
"TRIPS-PLUS"
THROUGH THE BACK DOOR: How BILATERAL TREATIES IMPOSE MUCH STRONGER

RULES FOR IPRs ON LIFE THAN THE WTO (2001) (highlighting how bilateral

agreements often fail to address the needs of all the parties they affect, essentially
"undermining political processes all over the world"), available at
http://www.grain.org/publications/trips-plus-en.cfin (last visited Sept. 6, 2003).
Notably, the Committee of Government Representatives on Civil Society,
established in 1998, suffers from a severe lack of credibility. See SARAH
ANDERSON & JOHN CAVANAGH, STATE OF THE DEBATE ON THE FREE TRADE AREA

OF THE AMERICAS 27 (Rockefeller Foundation, 2002) (remarking that many of the
Committee's members were not present at the first North American forum in
Merida, Mexico, thus hindering the Committee's ability to address the needs of
society groups who wished to make the Committee more accountable), availableat

http://www.tradeobservatory.org/library/uploadedfiles/State-of Play
-on-the FTAA.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2003).

70. See Essential Action Letter, supra note 68 (noting how the FTAA will lock
in only TRIPS provisions that "diminish the public domain," including access to
necessary information associated with agreements).
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As mentioned, the Draft Chapter on IPRs incorporates provisions
on the protection of genetic resources, traditional knowledge, and
folklore, which were persistently requested by developing
countries.7" Gaps in the international intellectual property system
routinely allow for the commercial exploitation of the developing
world's vast biodiversity resources and valuable traditional
knowledge without authorization from the country or the local
community. Developing countries have repeatedly asserted, in
different fora, a need for international intellectual property norms to
ensure adequate protection, but such proposals have never gained
consensus.7 2 In the FTAA framework, agreement between the
Members may not be forthcoming either. FTAA Members have, in
fact, not reached consensus on these issues and the entire sections
dealing with folklore, traditional knowledge, and genetic resources
remain in brackets.73 While including these provisions would be a
positive outcome, their fate remains uncertain.

B. RISKS
The potential limitations that the Draft Chapter on IPRs would
impose on countries' regulatory abilities are much more definite. The
Draft Chapter on IPRs creates "TRIPS-plus" standards, both in
provisions establishing the general principles of the system and in

71. See Second Draft, supra note 59, pt. II, secs. 4, 6 (providing for the
protection of folklore, traditional knowledge, and access to genetic resources).
72. See generally, e.g., Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, The Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the
Convention on Biological Diversity and the Protection of TraditionalKnowledge,
IP/C/W/403 (June 24, 2003) (providing information on a submission to the Council
concerned proposed amendments to the TRIPS Agreement), available at

http://docsonline.wto.org/gen-search.asp?searchmode=simple (last visited Oct. 22,
2003); Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Taking
Forwardthe Review ofArticle 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, IP/C/W/404 (June
26, 2003) (stressing concerns by the "African Group" that Article 27.3(b) of the
TRIPS
Agreement
need
finalization)),
available
at
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen-search.asp?searchmode=simple (last visited Oct. 22,
2003).
73. See Second Draft, supra note 59, pt. II, secs. 4, 6 (outlining material that is

still under debate by Members).

2003]

BILATERAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AGREEMENTS

61

dealing with specific IPRs areas.74 Such an extensive protection of
intellectual property would deprive countries of essential room to
take measures to protect the public interest and to ensure sustainable
development.
1. GeneralProvisions of the Draft Chapter on IPRs
The general provisions of the Draft Chapter on IPRs establish key
elements of the FTAA intellectual property system and incorporate
several concepts that may have negative consequences for a balanced
intellectual property system. In Part I of the Draft Chapter, these
provisions describe the nature and scope of the obligations, the
general objectives and principles, and the relationship of the FTAA
Agreement with other intellectual property treaties.75 Several of these
provisions may limit important flexibility in implementing national
legislation. For example, the Draft Chapter on IPRs requires parties
to provide "adequate and effective protection and enforcement" of
IPRs.76 While effective enforcement measures are an essential part of
the intellectual property system, they must be geared not only
towards protecting the private rights of the IPRs holders but also
towards enforcing their obligations to society. The language in the
Draft Chapter is derived from instruments in which the enforcement
of IPRs focuses on compulsion; it does not incorporate any other
mechanisms that acknowledge the delicate balance between various
societal interests in intellectual property. Such instruments include,
for instance, the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA"),7 7 Special 301 of the U.S. Trade Act, and other bilateral
intellectual property or trade agreements. For example, Section 301
of the U.S. Trade Act requires the U.S. Trade Representative to
identify those foreign countries that deny "adequate and effective
protection" for intellectual property, even if they are in compliance

74. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the Draft Chapter's intellectual property
standards).
75. See id. pt. I, arts. 1-5 (stating the basic purpose and principles of the FTAA
Chapter on IPRs).
76. See id. pt. I, art. 1.1 (requiring also that these rights do not restrict trade).
77. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1992, 107 Stat.
2057, 32 I.L.M. 289.
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with obligations under the TRIPS Agreement."8 The same
unbalanced approach to enforcement in the FTAA may eliminate the
flexibility left in other parts of the Draft Chapter on IPRs.
Another potentially problematic provision in this section is the
establishment of the doctrine of regional exhaustion. One of the
inherent, tenets of IPRs is that they are limited privileges. Exhaustion
is the principle that addresses the point at which the IPR holder's
control over the good or service ceases.79 Once the IPR holder is able
to obtain an economic return from the first sale or placing on the
market, the right is exhausted and the purchaser is entitled to use and
dispose of the good or service without further restriction. 0 A country
may choose to recognize that exhaustion when a good or service is
first sold or marketed anywhere outside its own borders, only in a
country of the region, or only within its territory. The option depends
on national policy concerns, such as the need to ensure
competitiveness of local companies and to recognize consumers'
"right to buy legitimate products from the lowest price source."8 1
Consequently, the TRIPS Agreement left the matter in the hands of
individual countries. 2 In contrast to the TRIPS Agreement, the draft
FTAA requires each party to adopt the principle of regional
78. See Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 241 1(a)(l)(B)(ii) (2003) (stating that

the United States Trade Representative must take an action when "an act, policy,
or practice of a foreign country is unjustifiable and burdens or restricts United
States commerce").
79. See UNCTAD-ICTSD, CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT,

TRIPS

AND DEVELOPMENT:

TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 79 (2003) [hereinafter UNCTADICTSD] (describing generally the doctrine of exhaustion), available at
http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/Resource Book.htm (last visited Sept. 10
RESOURCE BOOK ON

2003).
80. See id. at 80 (elaborating further on the concept of exhaustion).
81. See SOUTH CENTRE, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: A GUIDE FOR THE SOUTH,
THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, ANNEX III. EXHAUSTION OF RIGHTS (Nov. 1997) [hereinafter
GUIDE FOR THE SOUTH] (discussing the impact of the exhaustion of rights

principle), available at http://www.soutlicentre.org/publications/trips/toc.htm (last
visited Sept. 10, 2003).
82. See Doha Declaration,supra note 46, para. 5(b) (stating that "[t]he effect
of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the exhaustion of
intellectual property rights is to leave each member free to establish its own regime
for such exhaustion without challenge.").
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exhaustion within five years after the Agreement enters into force,
which would terminate an important element of flexibility in
international intellectual property standards.83
The FTAA Agreement also requires parties to implement
provisions from other IPRs treaties, further eliminating flexibility.8 4
This type of integration is not new; the TRIPS Agreement itself
incorporates provisions of other treaties, particularly those included
in the framework of WIPO. 85 The reference in that case resolved
questions regarding the relationship between the two institutions, but
also, according to some commentators, created a loophole for raising
the minimum standards of the TRIPS Agreement without the need
for WTO consensus.86 The same loophole is particularly worrisome
in the FTAA Agreement. The number of treaties the FTAA will
conceivably incorporate is higher and includes several still being
negotiated. 7 Since the tendency in multilateral and bilateral
instruments is to increase intellectual property standards, the FTAA
Agreement may, through this process, incorporate these higher
standards and further diminish countries' ability to shape their own
intellectual property systems."8

83. See Second Draft, supra note 59, pt. I, art. 4 (asserting the FTAA draft
agreement position on exhaustion of rights).
84. See id. pt. I, art. 5.2 (listing eighteen agreements to which parties shall give
effect).
85. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, arts. 1 & 2 (incorporating the

protections of various legal instruments).
86. See UNCTAD/ICTSD, supra note 79, at 12 (discussing WIPO as a means
of increasing intellectual property protections even where international consensus
at
available
lacking),
otherwise
is
http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs/RB-partlcorrected.pdf (last visited
Sept. 13, 2003).
87. See Eugui, supra note 60, at 18 (arguing that serious concerns are raised
"about potentially giving intellectual property negotiators a 'blank check' to
actually write ... the IPR protection obligations that FTAA members would have
a prioricommitted to enforce").
88. See generally IPR COMMISSION, supra note 4. The purpose of the
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights is to integrate development rights into
the policy of IPRs. Id. at i.
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2. Specific IPR Provisions
Part II of the Draft Chapter on IPRs, which addresses concrete
categories of IPRs, also presents clear examples of rising intellectual
property standards that may have perilous implications for
sustainable development.8 9 The provisions regarding patents
demonstrate a pattern of broader and more extensive rights. The
FTAA Agreement would extend the period and the scope of
protection, and eliminate key limitations on patent rights. 90 It would
thus decrease the flexibility needed to adapt patent regimes to
countries' individual economic and social conditions. 9
While the term of protection for patents in the Draft Chapter on
IPRs is twenty years from the filing date, as in the TRIPS
Agreement, the FTAA would require parties to extend the term of
patent protection in certain circumstances. Countries would have to
extend the period of patent protection, for instance, to compensate
for any unreasonable delays in granting a patent and to match the
period of extension provided by the country conducting the
examination of the invention. 92 The Draft Chapter on IPRs also
expands the scope of patents to include any biological material
derived through multiplication or propagation of the patented
product, or directly obtained from the patented process. 93 In other
words, the FTAA would require countries to grant patent protection
to plants and animals obtained from patented microorganisms or
through patented processes, thus undermining the inclusion of plants

89. See Second Draft, supra note 59, pt. II (providing provisions that decrease
the flexibility necessary to adapt intellectual property protections to developing

countries).
90. See id. pt. II, sec. 5 (defining the rights of patents holders).
91. See IPR COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 113 (stating that different countries

may want to adopt systems with different degrees of patent protections).
92. See Second Draft,supra note 59, pt. II, sec. 5, art. 8 (stating that each party
"shall extend the term of a patent to compensate for unreasonable delays that occur
in the granting the patent"). Additionally, when one party grants a patent based on

an examination of an invention conducted in another country, "that Party, at the
request of the patent owner, shall extend the term of a patent granted under such
procedure by a period equal to the period of the extension, if any, provided in

respect of the patent granted by such other country." Id.
93. See id. pt. II, sec. 5, art. 3 (covering patents that protect a "biological
product or process that claims to have specific characteristics").
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and animals in the exceptions to patentability.94 In addition, the
chapter on IPRs incorporates the UPOV Convention for plant variety
protection,95 which raises a number of questions for sustainable
development.
Moreover, the FTAA limits the use of compulsory licensing,96 a
critical instrument for developing countries to ensure that patents
fulfill their sustainable development needs. 97 Compulsory licensing
refers to the right of governments to authorize itself or third parties to
use the subject matter of a patent without the authorization of the
right holder for public policy reasons. 98 The TRIPS Agreement
names anti-competitive prices, non-commercial use, emergency, and
extreme urgency as reasons to allow compulsory licensing. 99
However, it does not limit countries' rights to establish compulsory
licenses on other grounds not explicitly mentioned. The Doha
Declaration states that "[e]ach member has the right to grant
compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds upon
which such licenses are granted.""1 ' The FTAA, however, limits the

94. See id. (requiring Members to not only protect the patented microorganism,
but to any biological material derived from the patented material).
95. See id. pt. I, art. 5 (requiring parties to give effect to various agreements,
including the UPOV Convention).
96. See id. pt. II, sec. 5, art. 5 (listing the various restrictions on compulsory

licenses).
97. See Susan K. Sell, Industry Strategiesfor Intellectual Property and Trade:
the Quest for TRIPS and Post-Trips Strategies, 10 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L.
79, 98 (2002) (stating that most developing countries believe that compulsory
licensing is a useful tool against foreign intellectual property holders).
98. See JEROME H. REICHMAN & CATHERINE HASENZAHL, ICTSD, NONVOLUNTARY LICENSING OF PATENTED INVENTIONS: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE,

LEGAL FRAMEWORK UNDER TRIPS, AND AN OVERVIEW OF THE PRACTICE IN
CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 4 (2002) (giving a historical
at
available
licensing),
compulsory
on
perspective
http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs/reichman hasenzahl.pdf (last visited

Sept. 13, 2003).
99. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 31 (providing provisions that a
Member must respect when using the subject matter of a patent without the right

holder's authorization).
100. Doha Declaration,supra note 46, para. 5.

AM. U. INT'L L. REV.

[19:45

use of compulsory licensing. 0' Under the chapter on IPRs, a
government may only grant compulsory licenses for public, noncommercial purposes, and during declared national emergencies or
other situations of extreme urgency. 10 2
In addition, the FTAA intellectual property system fails to
recognize the difficulties that countries with insufficient or no
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector face in making
effective use of compulsory licensing, as acknowledged by the Doha
Declaration. While article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement states that
compulsory licensing shall be authorized "predominantly for the
supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use,"
WTO Members concede that certain circumstances, call for waiving
this provision. 0 3 The draft Chapter on IPRs of the FTAA clearly
states, though, that the authorization for a compulsory license would
"not entitle a private party acting on behalf of the Government to sell
products produced pursuant to such authorization to a party other
than the Government, or to export the product outside the territory of
the Party."'10 4 Countries without pharmaceutical manufacturing
capacity in the Americas would thus lose any flexibility to ensure
access to essential medicines and the right to health.

CONCLUSION
The Commission on Intellectual Property Rights concluded that,
"[j]ust because some is good, more isn't necessarily better."'0 5 In fact,
higher standards of protection for IPRs in some circumstances are

101. See Second Draft, supra note 59, pt. II, sec. 5, art. 5 (listing various
restrictions on compulsory licenses).
102. See id. (subjecting a patent to compulsory licensing possibly any time
"following the declaration by a Party of the existence of public interest,

emergency, or national security considerations").
103. A decision to allow countries with no pharmaceutical manufacturing
capacity to effectively use compulsory licensing was reached shortly before the
Fifth Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Cancun.
104. Second Draft, supra note 59, pt. II, sec. 5, art. 5.
105. See IPR

COMMISSION,

supra note 4, at 123-24 (noting that the purpose of

the modem patent system is to stimulate invention by rewarding inventors).
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against the public interest. 10 6 Developing countries need the
flexibility to design and regulate their intellectual property protection
to meet their unique conditions. International intellectual property
0 7
rules, however, are slowly eradicating that flexibility.
The FTAA negotiations, rather than turning the tide for sustainable
development, are merely another stepping stone to higher intellectual
property standards. Developing countries may find themselves in a
position of having to protect exhaustively the broad rights of
intellectual property holders because they are unable to establish
limitations on IPRs in the public interest.
As presented today, the FTAA Agreement poses serious risks to
sustainable development. It establishes TRIPS-plus standards, which
will greatly hamper the ability of developing countries in the
Americas to regulate intellectual property and will limit their ability
to meet their own needs and objectives. Intellectual property
protection would need to be rebalanced in terms of strength and
scope and even then, the question remains: should intellectual
property be dealt with at all in regional trade agreements?

106. See Id. at 8 (asserting that high levels of intellectual property protection
may not be appropriate in developing countries).
107. See supra Part I.B. (positing that international standards are decreasing the
flexibility of IPRs).

